ROBERTO M. VILLANUEVA, G.R.
No. 167726
Petitioner,
Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
PUNO,
- versus - QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
COURT
OF APPEALS and CARPIO-MORALES,
HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, CALLEJO, SR.,
Represented by ROBERTO P. AZCUNA,
NAZARENO, in his capacity TINGA,
as Secretary General, CHICO-NAZARIO,
Respondents.
GARCIA, and
VELASCO,
JR., JJ.
Promulgated:
July 20, 2006
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D E C I S I O N
Tinga, J.:
Assailed in this Rule 45 Petition for
Review[1] is
the Decision[2] dated 27
August 2003 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 75002, and its
Resolution[3]
dated 29 March 2005 denying herein petitioner Roberto M. Villanueva’s
(Villanueva) Motion for Reconsideration.[4] The
dispositive portion of the challenged Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari
is GRANTED. The questioned resolutions of the Civil Service
Commission is (sic) hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the said
respondent ORDERED to CEASE AND DESIST from implementing the
same. The Decision of the House of Representatives Disciplinary Board dated
No Costs.
SO ORDERED.[5]
The antecedents are as follows:
On
Maramba
and Castillo narrated that when they came upon said office at around
Villanueva’s
immediate supervisor, Jose Ma. Antonio B. Tuano, Chief of the Cashiering and
Administrative Records Division, lodged the complaint against the former.[9] Incidentally,
no charges were filed against Navarro-Arguelles as the House Disciplinary Board
has no jurisdiction over confidential assistants of Representatives.[10]
The
House Disciplinary Board, after hearing, found Villanueva guilty as charged and
suspended him for one (1) year without pay with a stern warning that any
infraction in the future will be dealt with more severely.[11]
However, acting on Villanueva’s motion for reconsideration, the House Disciplinary
Board increased the penalty to dismissal with forfeiture of all benefits.[12]
Speaker
Manuel B. Villar, Jr. affirmed the latter Decision of the House Disciplinary
Board in a Resolution[13]
dated
Villanueva then interposed an appeal before
the Civil Service Commission (the Commission) which, on
WHEREFORE, the appeal of
Robert[o] M. Villanueva is hereby partly GRANTED. The Commission holds
that Villanueva is guilty of Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct for which he is
meted the penalty of one (1) year suspension. In all other respects, the
decisions appealed from are affirmed.
Considering that Villanueva has been
out of the service for more than the imposed suspension, he should now be
reinstated to his former position. It is understood that this reinstatement
shall not carry with it the payment of back salaries and other entitlements,
for he is not totally exonerated.[17]
In
its motion for reconsideration, the House prayed for the re-imposition of the
penalty of dismissal on Villanueva. For his part, Villanueva moved for partial
reconsideration, seeking that he be awarded his benefits for the period of
January 1999 to February 2001. The Commission denied both motions in Resolution
No. 021492[18] dated
In
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure filed
on 20 January 2003 before the Court of Appeals, the House ascribed grave abuse
of discretion to the Commission for reducing the penalty to a mere suspension.
In
its challenged Decision, the Court of Appeals granted the petition for
certiorari and sustained the Decision of the House Disciplinary Board
dismissing Villanueva. In arriving at this conclusion, the Court of Appeals
emphasized the similarity of the factual circumstances of the case at bar with Dicdican
v. Fernan, Jr.,[20]
wherein the Court dismissed the court personnel found guilty of disgraceful and
immoral conduct.[21] The
appellate court stated that adherence to case law dictates the imposition of a
similar penalty for the similar offense in the case at bar. Otherwise, the
Court would be imposing on judicial employees more stringent standards than
employees of the Legislature or the Executive.[22]
The
appellate court likewise pointed out that the Commission gravely erred in
failing to recognize the gravity of
Villanueva’s misconduct, stressing that Villanueva not only disregarded his
marriage vows but also exhibited total disrespect of the marital status of Elizabeth
Navarro-Arguelles.[23]
Moreover,
the Court of Appeals held that Villanueva’s offense relates to his official
functions as it was made possible precisely by his official functions. By
virtue of his position, Villanueva had free rein inside the building even after
office hours. Clearly, therefore, Villanueva used his office to commit the misconduct
for which he was charged,[24]
it concluded.
Finally,
the appellate court disclosed its desire to improve the public regard of the
government sector by safeguarding morality in the ranks.[25]
The Court of Appeals likewise denied
Villanueva’s Motion for Reconsideration.[26]
Thus, Villanueva filed the instant petition.
In
the instant petition, Villanueva insists that the appellate court did not have
jurisdiction over the House’s petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure as it was a substitute for lost appeal.[27] Villanueva
also maintains that the Commission acted well within the confines of its
jurisdiction when it imposed the penalty prescribed by law for disgraceful and
immoral conduct.[28]
Villanueva likewise contends that the Dicdican adjudication finds no application in the instant case as it was
arrived at in the Court’s exercise of its administrative jurisdiction over its
personnel.[29]
Further, Villanueva points out that his misconduct is in no way connected with
his official functions and it cannot thus be equated with grave misconduct as
defined by law.[30]
In
its Comment,[31] the
House contends that an appeal from the decision of the Commission would not
constitute a speedy and adequate remedy thus necessitating the resort to the
remedy of certiorari under Rule 65. The House reasons that the decision of the
Commission was immediately executory and its execution would not have been
stayed by an ordinary appeal.[32]
The House also maintains that the ruling of the appellate court is in accordance
with law and jurisprudence, particularly the Dicdican case. The House argues that employees of the
legislature, just like employees of the judiciary, should be subject to the
same exacting standards of morality and decency in their professional and
private conduct.[33]
Lastly,
the House posits that since Villanueva was found guilty of Grave Misconduct,
Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of
the Service, dismissal indeed is the appropriate penalty.[34]
In
his Reply,[35]
Villanueva maintains, among other things, that even if an
appeal before the Court of Appeals does not stop the execution of the
Commission’s Decision the House could have applied for a restraining order or
injunction to stay it,[36] noting
that Section 82, Rule VI of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service[37]
provides, thus:
Section
82. Effect
of Pendency of Petition for Review/Certiorari with the Court.—The
filing and pendency of a petition for review with the Court of Appeals or
certiorari with the Supreme Court shall not stop the execution of the final
decision of the Commission unless the Court issues a restraining order or an
injunction.
Moreover, Villanueva points out that
the House could have easily availed of the remedy of appeal under Rule 43 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
The House received a copy of the assailed
resolution of the Commission on
The
Court finds merit in the petition.
At
the outset, we find that the Court of Appeals erred in giving due course to the
House’s petition for certiorari as it was filed in lieu of an appeal which
is the prescribed remedy. Section 5, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure states that final orders or resolutions of the Commission are
appealable to the Court of Appeals through a petition for review. However, instead
of availing of the remedy of appeal, the House resorted to the wrong remedy of certiorari.
Notably,
the House received the assailed resolution of the Commission on
Settled is the rule that a special civil
action of certiorari is not a substitute for a lost or lapsed remedy of appeal.[39]
As the Court aptly held in David v. Cordova,[40]
to wit:
x x x x Where appeal is available to
the aggrieved party, the action for certiorari will not be entertained. The
remedies of appeal (including petitions for review) and certiorari are mutually
exclusive, not alternative or successive. Hence, certiorari is not and cannot
be a substitute for an appeal, especially if one’s own negligence or error in
one’s choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse. One of the requisites of
certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper,
even if the ground therefor[e]
is grave abuse of discretion.[41]
That
appeals to the Court of Appeals do not stop the execution of decisions of the
Commission is not sufficient justification for resorting to the remedy of
certiorari. As correctly pointed out by Villanueva, the execution of the
decision of the Commission may be stayed if the House applies for and the
appellate court so issues a restraining order or an injunction.[42]
This thus enunciates the reality that, under the circumstances, an appeal from
the decision of the Commission was an adequate and speedy remedy foreclosing
the need for a Rule 65 petition for certiorari.
As the House failed to file a timely appeal,
the Court of Appeals should have denied outright its petition for certiorari. Moreover,
even if such petition was not procedurally flawed, still and all, it was bereft
of merit and the appellate court erred in granting it.
First,
the appellate court erred when it concurred with the House’s contention that
Villanueva’s offense should be classified as grave misconduct.
Following
a string of precedents, Amosco v. Magro[43]
defines misconduct in this wise:
Misconduct in office has a definite
and well understood legal meaning. By uniform legal definition, it is a misconduct such as affects his performance of his duties
as an officer and not such only as affects his character as a private
individual…. It is settled that misconduct, misfeasance, or malfeasance
warranting removal from office of an officer, must have direct relation to and
be connected with the performance of official duties amounting either to
maladministration or willful, intentional neglect and failure to discharge the
duties of the office.[44]
Misconduct
means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or
standard of behavior, especially by a government official. To constitute an
administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the
performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer. In grave
misconduct as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption,
clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule, must
be manifest. Corruption as an element of grave misconduct consists in the act
of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his
station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person,
contrary to duty and the rights of others. [45]
In
the present case, Villanueva’s offense was in no way connected with the
performance of his functions and duties as a public officer. Sure, his office
was used as a venue for the commission of the offense and definitely, his
offense speaks despicably of his character as a man but it in no way evinced
any failure on his part to discharge his duties as a public officer. Yes,
Villanueva’s offense is gravely immoral and reprehensible but it falls short
of grave misconduct as defined by law.
To
determine whether a public officer committed misconduct, it is necessary to
separate the character of the man from the character of the officer.[46]
Here, Villanueva’s transgression laid bare the values of his inner being but
did not expose any of his shortcoming as a public officer. Who Villanueva is
and what he believes in are inconsequential in concluding whether his
misdemeanor amounts to misconduct. Rather, what is material is whether
Villanueva properly discharged his
public functions which we believe in no way was compromised or affected by the
commission of his offense.
However,
as correctly found by the Commission, we believe that Villanueva is guilty of Disgraceful
and Immoral Conduct for having engaged in an illicit affair. In a catena of cases, the Court has ruled
that government employees engaged in illicit relations are guilty of
“disgraceful and immoral conduct” for which he/she may be held administratively
liable.[47]
According
to Section 22 (o), Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 and Section 52 A (15) of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,[48] the
first offense of Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct is punishable by
suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year. A second offense
is punishable by dismissal.
As
Villanueva is a first-time offender, the proper penalty is suspension. The
Commission therefore correctly meted out said penalty. It clearly acted in
accordance with law and no grave abuse of discretion can be ascribed to it
contrary to the appellate court’s finding.
Moreover,
we do not agree with the appellate court’s ruling that Dicdican should
be the controlling precedent such that the penalty of dismissal should be
imposed in the instant case.
As
correctly pointed out by Villanueva, when the Supreme Court acts on complaints
against judges or any of the personnel under its supervision and control, it acts
as personnel administrator imposing discipline and not as a court judging
justiciable controversies.[49]
In
Dicdican, the Court sanctioned its errant personnel according to what it
believed to be the commensurate punishment. We deemed it wise to impose more
stringent standards primarily to show that we are serious in policing our
ranks. We imposed punishment in Dicdican as we deemed it proper,
according to our own policies, but not without the guidance of the rules in the
civil service. In this case, however, we are not acting as a personnel
administrator but rather as the adjudicative appellate tribunal of last resort reviewing
the decisions of lower courts. It is our responsibility to confirm whether the
lower courts upheld the law. The law in this case clearly states that the
proper penalty is suspension and not dismissal as held by the appellate court,
hence, suspension it must be.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 27 August 2003 of the Court of
Appeals in C.A.- G.R. SP No. 75002 and its Resolution dated 29 March 2005
denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Resolution No.
020536 dated
SO
ORDERED.
DANTE
O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
|
REYNATO S. PUNO Associate
Justice |
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
|
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate
Justice |
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice |
|
(On Official Leave) ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate
Justice |
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate
Justice |
|
RENATO C. CORONA Associate
Justice |
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
|
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate
Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice |
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate
Justice |
CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate
Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
C
E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13
of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[2]
[7]
[39]David v. Cordova, G.R. No. 152992, 28
July 2005, 464 SCRA 384, 395; Tuazon, Jr. v. Godoy, G.R. No. 146927,